



# UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
United States Patent and Trademark Office  
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450  
www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/581,046	04/25/2007	Maki Sato	11197/15	6773
23838 7590 01/12/2009 KENYON & KENYON LLP 1500 K STREET N.W. SUITE 700 WASHINGTON, DC 20005				
EXAMINER				
LEE, DORIS L				
ART UNIT		PAPER NUMBER		
1796				
MAIL DATE		DELIVERY MODE		
01/12/2009		PAPER		

**Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.**

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

### Office Action Summary

**Application No.**

10/581,046

**Applicant(s)**

SATO ET AL.

**Examiner**

Doris L. Lee

**Art Unit**

1796

**Period for Reply** -- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**Status**

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 24 December 2008.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

**Disposition of Claims**

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-27 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) 13-21 is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-12 and 22-27 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

**Application Papers**

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119**

- 12) ☒ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☒ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
1. ☒ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

**Attachment(s)**

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☒ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-85/86)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date 20060530, 20061213
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date \_\_\_\_\_
- 5) ☐ Notice of Inventor's Patent Application
- 6) ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

## **DETAILED ACTION**

### ***Election/Restrictions***

1. Applicant's election of Group II (claims 1-12 and 22-27) in the reply filed on December 24, 2008 is acknowledged. Because applicant did not distinctly and specifically point out the supposed errors in the restriction requirement, the election has been treated as an election without traverse (MPEP § 818.03(a)). Applicant states that claims 1, 2, 5-12 and 22-27 are generic because they read on both Groups I and II, however, a generic claim needs to read on all the species presented in the application and since the claims 1, 2, 5-12 and 22-27 do not read on Group III, they are not considered generic (please refer to MPEP 806.04(d) [R-3]). The requirement is deemed proper and is therefore made FINAL.

### ***Claim Objections***

2. **Claim 24** objected to because of the following informalities: "cooing water" appears to be a typo; it should be amended to read "cooling water". Appropriate correction is required.

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103***

3. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

4. **Claims 1-9, 12, 22, and 26** are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over **Takeuchi et al (US 6,245,880)**.

**Regarding claims 1 and 3**, Takeuchi teaches a thermoplastic resin composition (Abstract) comprising an organophosphorus compound represented by General Formula (2) (col. 5, lines 5-20) and General Formula (3) (col. 5, lines 25-50) and a thermoplastic resin (Abstract) and the phosphorus content is not less than 500 ppm and not more than 500,000 ppm (col. 8, lines 14-15).

It is well settled that where the prior art describes the components of a claimed compound or compositions in concentrations within or overlapping the claimed concentrations a prima facie case of obviousness is established. See *In re Harris*, 409 F.3d 1339, 1343, 74 USPQ2d 1951, 1953 (Fed. Cir. 2005); *In re Peterson*, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329, 65 USPQ 2d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1997); *In re Woodruff*, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 16 USPQ2d 1934, 1936-37 (CCPA 1990); *In re Malagari*, 499 F.2d 1297, 1303, 182 USPQ 549, 553 (CCPA 1974).

Regarding the limitation "for masterbatch", case law holds that a recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim. See *In re Casey*, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967) and *In re Otto*, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963).

Furthermore, applicants attention is drawn to MPEP 2111.02 which states that "if the body of a claim fully and intrinsically sets forth all the limitations of the claimed invention, and the preamble merely states, for example, the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention's

limitations, then the preamble is not considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction". Further, MPEP 2111.02 states that statements in the preamble reciting the purpose or intended use of the claimed invention must be evaluated to determine whether the purpose or intended use results in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art. Only if such structural difference exists, does the recitation serve to limit the claim. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim.

It is the examiner's position that the preamble does not state any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention's limitations and further that the purpose or intended use, i.e. for masterbatch, recited in the present claims does not result in a structural difference between the presently claimed invention and the prior art invention and further that the prior art structure which is a composition identical to that set forth in the present claims is capable of performing the recited purpose or intended use.

**Regarding claims 2 and 4**, Takeuchi teaches that the thermoplastic resin contains a bivalent metal in an amount from 1 – 150 ppm (col. 7, lines 50-60).

**Regarding claim 5**, Takeuchi teaches that the divalent metal is zinc (col. 8, lines 8-9).

**Regarding claim 6**, this is a product-by-process claim, patentability of said claim is based on the recited product (thermoplastic resin) and does not depend on its method of production. Since the instant product is the same as product disclosed by Takeuchi the claim is unpatentable even if the Takeuchi product was made by a different process. In re Marosi, 710 F2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See MPEP 2113.

**Regarding claim 7**, Takeuchi teaches that the resin is polyester (Abstract).

**Regarding claim 8**, Takeuchi teaches that the polyester is polyethylene terephthalate (col. 22, lines 20-40).

**Regarding claim 9**, this is a product-by-process claim, patentability of said claim is based on the recited product (thermoplastic resin) and does not depend on its method of production. Since the instant product is the same as product disclosed by Takeuchi the claim is unpatentable even if the Takeuchi product was made by a different process. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 798, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See MPEP 2113.

**Regarding claim 12**, Takeuchi teaches that the L-value is greater than 25 (Col. 23, 24 Table 1).

**Regarding claim 22**, as Takeuchi teaches all the components of the thermoplastic composition, it is therefore inherent that the prior art composition has the claimed melt viscosity since such a property is evidently dependent upon the nature of the composition used. Case law holds that a material and its properties are inseparable. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

**Regarding claim 26**, Takeuchi teaches a thermoplastic resin comprising an organophosphorus compound represented by General Formula (2) (col. 5, lines 5-20) and General Formula (3) (col. 5, lines 25-50) and a thermoplastic resin (Abstract) and the phosphorus content is not less than 500 ppm and not more than 500,000 ppm (col. 8, lines 14-15). It is noted that if the thermoplastic resin used is the same as the resin used in the masterbatch, this will result just result in a dilution of the organophosphorus

compound, and thus given the range of the phosphorus compound as cited above, Takeuchi teaches the claimed composition.

5. **Claim 10 and 11** are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over **Takeuchi et al (US 6,245,880)** in view of **Tamura et al (US 2002/0186120)**.

The discussion regarding Takeuchi in paragraph 4 above is incorporated here by reference.

**Regarding claims 10 and 11**, Takeuchi fails to teach the addition of a weather-resistance-imparting agent which is at least one compound selected from hindered-amine compounds, nitrogen-containing hindered phenolic compounds, metal salt hindered phenolic compounds, phenolic compounds, hindered phenolic compounds and sulfur compounds.

Tamura teaches a polyester composition (Abstract) teaches that hindered amines are photo stabilizers and hindered phenols are antioxidants ([0053]) and that these are conventional additives to resins ([0053]).

It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to use the hindered amine or the hindered phenol of Tamura in the composition of Takeuchi. One would have been motivated to do so in order to improve the resin's resistance to light and oxygen. They are combinable because they are concerned with the same field of endeavor, namely polyester resins.

6. **Claim 23** is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over **Takeuchi et al (US 6,245,880)** in view of **Marston et al (WO 02/063079)**

The discussion regarding Takeuchi in paragraph 4 above is incorporated here by reference.

**Regarding claim 23**, Takeuchi teaches the composition, but fails to teach that the thermoplastic resin composition is in the form of chips with a height, width or length of 1 mm or more.

Marston teaches that polyester chips are typically sized with a length of 3 mm and a cross-sectional diameter of 3 mm (page 29, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph).

It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to use composition of Takeuchi in the chip size taught by Marston. One would have been motivated to do so in order to receive the expected benefit of people able to use the composition in an extruder (Marston, page 29, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph). They are combinable because they are concerned with the same field of endeavor, namely polyester resins.

7. **Claims 24 and 25** are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over **Takeuchi et al (US 6,245,880)** in view of **Eto et al (JP 2003-147063, see Derwent abstract for reference mapping)**, **Park et al (US 5,478,911)** and **Chen et al (US 5,916,677)**.

The discussion regarding Takeuchi in paragraph 4 above is incorporated here by reference.

**Regarding claim 24**, Takeuchi discloses the thermoplastic resin as elucidated the rejection of claim 1 and claim 3 above. However, Takeuchi does not disclose the method of producing chips.



Eto teaches that polyester can be made into chips by discharging from an extruder and then solidified and then cut into chips (page 2, preferred process section). It is evidenced by Park that extrusion of polyester results in a spaghetti, or rod-like structure (col. 9, lines 1-10).

However, Eto fails to teach that the extruder is a spinneret.

Chen teaches that extrusion of polyester can occur in a spinneret (col. 3, lines 18-25).

It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to use the method of Eto on the composition of Takeuchi. One would have been motivated to do so in order to make the material taught by Takeuchi into chip size which is a typical size for many polymer processing methods. They are combinable because they are both concerned with the same field of endeavor, namely polyester.

It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to use the spinneret, because it would be nothing more than the use of a known technique to a known product to yield predictable results. *KSR v. Teleflex*, 550 U.S. \_\_, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007).

**Regarding claim 25**, modified Takeuchi teaches that cooling with air can occur prior to cooling the polyester with water (Eto, page 2, preferred process section).

It is the examiner's position that the air cooling time is a result effective variables because changing them will clearly affect the type of product obtained. The air cooling time is dependent on many variables, such as diameter of the extruded material, speed

of extrusion, temperature of the air, the air flow rate, etc... See MPEP § 2144.05 (B).

Case law holds that "discovery of an optimum value of a result effective variable in a known process is ordinarily within the skill of the art." See *In re Boesch*, 617 F.2d 272, 205 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1980).

In view of this, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to utilize appropriate air cooling time, including those within the scope of the present claims, so as to produce desired end results.

8. **Claim 27** is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over **Takeuchi et al (US 6,245,880)** in view of **Murschall et al (US 2002/0128358)**.

The discussion regarding Takeuchi in paragraph 4 above is incorporated here by reference.

**Regarding claim 27**, please refer to the rejection of claims 1 and 3 above for the compositional limitations.

Takeuchi fails to teach the method for producing a thermoplastic resin composition comprising mixing 0.5 to 90% by weight of the thermoplastic resin composition with a thermoplastic resin whose type is the same as or different from the type of the thermoplastic resin used in the thermoplastic resin composition for masterbatches.

Murschall teaches a masterbatch ([0036]) which contains phosphorus flame retardant compounds ([0019]) and that both the resins in the masterbatch and in the final composition are polyesters ([0036]). Murschall teaches that the flame retardant is fed into the final composition via 20% by weight of the masterbatch ([0073]).

It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to use the masterbatch process of Murschall using the composition of Takeuchi. One would have been motivated to do so in order to receive the expected benefit of producing a flame-retardant resin in a cost effective manner ([0041]). They are combinable because they are concerned with the same field of endeavor, namely polyesters with flame retardants.

### ***Double Patenting***

9. The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., *In re Berg*, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with this application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement.

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

### **Double Patenting I**

10. **Claims 1-5, 7 and 8** are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over **claims 13-18 of U.S. Patent No.**

**6,245,880**. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably

distinct from each other because the both teach polyester compositions with the same organophosphorus compound and divalent metal (zinc).

11. **Claims 1-5, 7 and 8** are directed to an invention not patentably distinct from **claims 13-18** of commonly assigned **US Patent No. 6,245,880**. Specifically, see the discussion in paragraph 10 above.

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office normally will not institute an interference between applications or a patent and an application of common ownership (see MPEP Chapter 2300). Commonly assigned US '880, discussed above, would form the basis for a rejection of the noted claims under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) if the commonly assigned case qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(e), (f) or (g) and the conflicting inventions were not commonly owned at the time the invention in this application was made. In order for the examiner to resolve this issue, the assignee can, under 35 U.S.C. 103(c) and 37 CFR 1.78(c), either show that the conflicting inventions were commonly owned at the time the invention in this application was made, or name the prior inventor of the conflicting subject matter.

A showing that the inventions were commonly owned at the time the invention in this application was made will preclude a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) based upon the commonly assigned case as a reference under 35 U.S.C. 102(f) or (g), or 35 U.S.C. 102(e) for applications pending on or after December 10, 2004.

**Double Patenting 2**

12. **Claims 1 and 3** are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over **claim 2** of copending

**Application No. 09/889,508.** Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the both recite a polyester composition with the same organophosphate compound.

The claims of App '508 fail to teach the amount of phosphorus content in the resin, however, in the specification of App '508, it teaches that the phosphorus compound is between 500 to 50,000 ppm (page 18, 3rd paragraph). Case law holds that those portions of the specification which provide support for the patent claims may also be examined and considered when addressing the issue of whether a claim in an application defines an obvious variation of an invention claimed in the patent. In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619,622 (CCPA 1970). Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the amount of phosphorus as taught in the specification in the claims of App '508 to arrive at the present invention.

This is a provisional obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

13. **Claims 1 and 3** are provisionally rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being obvious over copending **Application No. 09/889,508** which has a common assignee with the instant application. Based upon the earlier effective U.S. filing date of the copending application, it would constitute prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) if published or patented. This provisional rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) is based upon a presumption of future publication or patenting of the conflicting application. Specifically, see the discussion in paragraph 12 above.

This provisional rejection might be overcome either by a showing under 37 CFR 1.132 that any invention disclosed but not claimed in the copending application was derived from the inventor of this application and is thus not the invention "by another," or by a showing of a date of invention for the instant application prior to the effective U.S. filing date of the copending application under 37 CFR 1.131. This rejection might also be overcome by showing that the copending application is disqualified under 35 U.S.C. 103(c) as prior art in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). See MPEP § 706.02(l)(1) and § 706.02(l)(2).

14. **Claims 1 and 3** directed to an invention not patentably distinct from claim 2 of commonly assigned **Application No. 09/889,508**. Specifically, see the discussion in paragraph 12 above.

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office normally will not institute an interference between applications or a patent and an application of common ownership (see MPEP Chapter 2300). Commonly assigned **Application '508**, discussed above, would form the basis for a rejection of the noted claims under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) if the commonly assigned case qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(e), (f) or (g) and the conflicting inventions were not commonly owned at the time the invention in this application was made. In order for the examiner to resolve this issue, the assignee can, under 35 U.S.C. 103(c) and 37 CFR 1.78(c), either show that the conflicting inventions were commonly owned at the time the invention in this application was made, or name the prior inventor of the conflicting subject matter.

A showing that the inventions were commonly owned at the time the invention in this application was made will preclude a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) based upon the commonly assigned case as a reference under 35 U.S.C. 102(f) or (g), or 35 U.S.C. 102(e) for applications pending on or after December 10, 2004.

***Conclusion***

15. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Doris L. Lee whose telephone number is (571)270-3872. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday - Thursday 7:30 am to 5 pm and every other Friday.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Vasu Jagannathan can be reached on (571)272-1119. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.

Application/Control Number: 10/581,046  
Art Unit: 1796

Page 15

/Doris L Lee/  
Examiner, Art Unit 1796

/Vasu Jagannathan/  
Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 1796